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The present paper focuses on sorting as a mechanism behind the well-established fact that there 
is a central region productivity premium. Using a model of heterogeneous firms that can move 
between regions, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) show how more productive firms sort themselves 
to the large core region. We extend this model by introducing different capital intensities among 
firms and sectors. In accordance with empirical evidence, more productive firms are assumed to 
be more capital intensive. As a result, our model can produce sorting to the large regions from 
both ends of the productivity distribution. Firms with high capital intensity and high 
productivity, as well as firms with very low productivity and low capital intensity, tend to 
relocate to the core. We use region and sector productivity distributions from Japanese micro 
data to test the predictions of the model. Several sectors show patterns consistent with 
two-sided sorting, and roughly an equal number of sectors seem to primarily be driven by 
sorting and selection. We also find supportive evidence for our model prediction that two-sided 
sorting occurs in sectors with high capital intensity. 
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those of the author(s), and do not present those of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry. 1 Introduction
Heterogeneity on the supply side is currently in vogue in many ￿elds of economics such as
macroeconomics, international trade and economic geography, where micro datasets make it
possible to study the behaviour of individual ￿rms. Models of heterogeneous ￿rms are used in
the international trade literature to explain observed di⁄erences between exporters and non-
exporters in terms of e.g. size and productivity (see Melitz 2003, Helpman et al. 2004 and
Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). However, while the study of ￿rms during the current globalization
period is highly important, it has lead to a relative neglect of a traditional focus of trade theory;
namely that of heterogeneous sectors (see e.g. Neary 2009).1
The present paper analyses a setting with heterogeneous sectors and heterogeneous ￿rms.
We focus on the impact of sector and ￿rm heterogeneity on ￿rm location and on the e⁄ects
on the ￿rm productivity distribution of di⁄erent locations. It is empirically well established
in the urban economics and economic geography literature that ￿rms in core areas, such as
urban areas or densely populated manufacturing areas, tend to be more productive than those
in peripheral regions (see Rosenthal and Strange 2004 and Melo et al. 2009 for a survey).
Common explanations for this empirical ￿nding are positive agglomeration externalities related
to technological spillovers, labour market pooling or better access to suppliers and customers.
Another source of higher productivity in core locations is stronger selection among ￿rms in
the core, as pointed out in the heterogenous ￿rms literature (see Melitz 2003, Helpman et al.
2004, and Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). Stronger competition in larger markets will induce the
least e¢ cient ￿rms to close down, thereby increasing average productivity.2 A third mechanism,
which is the focus of the present paper, is spatial sorting of heterogeneous ￿rms. Baldwin and
Okubo (2006) show how high productivity ￿rms would tend to sort themselves to the larger
regions.3 Their theoretical framework combines the ￿ footloose capital￿trade and location model
by Martin and Rogers (1995) and the heterogeneous ￿rms model by Melitz (2003). Spatial
sorting happens because more productive ￿rms have higher sales and therefore have more to
gain from lower transportation costs in the large core market. They are also better equipped
for coping with the higher competition in the core.
The present paper introduces di⁄erent capital (or R&D) intensities among ￿rms and sectors
in the spatial sorting model by Baldwin and Okubo (2006). In line with empirical evidence,
we assume that large and highly productive ￿rms use more capital (R&D) and relatively less
labour. We also allow the tendency to higher capital intensity among more productive ￿rms to
1Some important exceptions exist, such as Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) who analyse sectors of di⁄erent
capital labour ratios in a heterogeneous ￿rms model.
2The di⁄erential selection e⁄ect in small and large markets is present in the original Melitz (2003) model as
well as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). However, many other models simplify away the market size e⁄ect e.g.
by assuming that wages are equalised by free trade in some constant returns sector.
3Okubo and Tomiura (2010b) tested this hypothesis, and found that low productivity ￿rms are more likely to
relocate from the core to the periphery in respons to a regional subsidy.
2be sector speci￿c. The capital intensity (or R&D intensity) di⁄ers substantially among ￿rms
and sectors in the data. Large and highly productive ￿rms use more capital, have a high
R&D intensity and use relatively less labour.4 At the sectoral level, chemical, pharmaceutical
and machinery industries are among the most highly capital and R&D intensive sectors.5 The
assumption of higher capital intensity among more productive ￿rms implies that our model can
generate sorting from both ends of the productivity distribution (two-sided sorting). Firms with
the highest return to capital have the strongest incentive to move from the periphery to the
core region. In our setting, these are the most productive ￿rms as well as the least productive
￿rms that have a very high labour to capital ratio. An implication of this is that the model
can generate core regions that have the most productive and mechanised ￿rms as well as e.g.
￿rms producing high priced hand-made items. We allow the tendency to two-sided sorting to be
sector-speci￿c in our model, which is consistent with empirical evidence showing very di⁄erent
location patterns among sectors (see e.g. Combe and Overman 2002).
While agglomeration externalities, selection and sorting all produce higher average pro-
ductivity among ￿rms in the core, they have very di⁄erent implications for the second- and
third-order moments of the productivity distribution of ￿rms. Agglomeration externalities im-
ply a upward shift of the entire distribution, which implies higher average productivity but
unchanged variance and skewness. Selection implies a truncation at the low end of the distrib-
ution in the core, as the least productive ￿rms are forced out of business. This implies that the
productivity distribution in the core has a lower variance (see Gatto, Ottaviano and Paganini,
2008). It also implies negative skewness in the core. Sorting, in contrast, would lead to a higher
variance (spread) in the core, as ￿rms from the end(s) of the ￿rm productivity distribution in the
periphery move to the core. Also one-sided sorting implies positive skewness in the periphery,
but this e⁄ect is dempened when there is two-sided sorting.
A few papers have used ￿rm-level data to test for selection e⁄ects on ￿rm productivity or
cost distributions. International trade implies stronger competition and is therefore one factor
that would lead to stronger ￿rm selection. Syverson (2004) does not ￿nd any relationship
between spreads of the productivity distribution of ￿rms and tradeability using a cross-section
of U.S. ￿rms. In contrast, using a panel of Italian ￿rms, Gatto, Ottaviano and Paganini (2008)
￿nd that intraindustry cost spreads are smaller in export oriented industries. Combes et al.
(2009) use a quantile regression on ￿rm establishment data to establish the relative importance
of agglomeration versus selection for the size of the productivity premia related to French cities.
They ￿nd that spatial productivity di⁄erences are mainly explained by agglomeration but that
selection is important for some relatively disaggregated sectors.
4One explanation for this could be that due to ￿nancial constraints, small ￿rms have di¢ culties in ￿nancing
capital investment (see Cabral and Mata 2002).
Hall (1992) points out the realtionship between R&D ￿nancing and ￿rm size. Boothby et al. (2008) and Cohen
and Klepper (1996) show that R&D expenditures are proportional to ￿rm size.
5For example, 60 to 70 percent of the total R&D expenditures in manufacturing are spent by the machinery
sectors only, according to Japanese sectoral data (JIP data in RIETI).
3This paper instead attempts to identify sectors where sorting is important. For this porpose,
we use ￿rm plant level data from Japan￿ s Census of Manufacturers covering virtually all plants
with more than ￿ve employees in 1990 classi￿ed at the three-digit sector level. We estimate
region- and sector-speci￿c kernel density functions for productivity, and we ￿nd that a large
number of sectors display productivity distributions consistent with one- or two-sided sorting,
and likewise that many sectors are consistent with selection and agglomeration. We also ￿nd
supportive evidence for our model prediction that two-sided sorting ocurrs in sectors with a
high capital intensity.
In a purely empirical paper, Okubo and Tomiura (2010a) use the same dataset to estimate
the aggregate productivity distribution on a regional level. They ￿nd a productivty premium
in the core, but also that the core hosts some low-productivty ￿rms. This ￿nding is consistent
with the present paper.
Our paper is related to that of Okubo, Picard and Thisse (2010) which uses the linear-
demand monopolistic competition set-up of Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) to analyse
the location choice of two types of ￿rms: low productive and high productive. Because of
lower mark-ups due to tougher competition in the large market, only the most productive ￿rms
will initially survive in that market. Competition spreads to both regions as trade costs come
down enough, which also leads the low productivity ￿rms to prefer the large market. This
outcome has similarities to our two-sided sorting equilibrium. However, our results are driven
by a completely di⁄erent mechanism where ￿rm and sector di⁄erences in capital intensity play
a crucial role. Our empirial analysis using micro data also supports the notion that two-sided
sorting is related to the capital intensity of sectors.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 contains empirical analysis. Finally, section
4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
This chapter uses the Baldwin and Okubo (2006) heterogenous ￿rm version of the ￿ footloose
capital￿new economic geography model by Martin and Rogers (1995). The model is enriched by
allowing for di⁄erent capital intensities among ￿rms. It is assumed that higher productivity is
associated with a higher capital stock, as documented by numerous empirical studies on micro
data (see Bernard et al. 2007).
2.1 Basics
There are two regions with assymmetric population (or market size). Core is the large region and
Periphery (denoted by *) is the small region. There two types of factors of production, capital
and labour. Capital, which is sector speci￿c, can move between regions but capital owners do
not. Workers can move freely between sectors but are immobile between regions. The larger
region, Core, is endowed with the share s(> 0:5); and the smaller region, Periphery, with 1 ￿ s
4of the world endowment of labour and capital, that is, countries are of di⁄erent size, but they
have identical capital labour ratios. A homogeneous good is produced with a constant-returns
technology only using labour. Di⁄erentiated manufactures are produced with increasing-returns
technologies using both capital and labour. There are m sectors of di⁄erentiated goods. The
mass of ￿rms in each sector is normalised to one, Nm ￿ 1, which means that the home country
has s ￿rms in each sector at outset. Firm productivities in each sector are distributed according
to a cumulative density function, Fm(a):
The ￿rms￿productivity level is also associated with ￿rm-speci￿c capital requirement. It is
assumed that more productive ￿rms have a higher capital requirement. However, this relation-










where ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿m > 0 are constants, and country subscripts are suppressed for ease of
notation
P
￿m = 1, CA is consumption of the homogenous good and di⁄erentiated goods from














￿ being the set of varieties consumed, ckm the amount of variety k from sector m consumed,
and ￿ > 1 the elasticity of substitution.
Each consumer spends a share ￿ of his income on manufactures, and constant fractions ￿m
of this are spent on varieties from each sector. Thus, it is possible to separately analyse the
equilibrium for each sector, and therefore we will henceforth when possible suppress the sector








where pk is the price of variety k, and Y income in the region.
The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of labour. This good is
freely traded, and since it is also chosen as the numeraire, we have
pA = w = 1; (4)
w being the wage of workers in both regions.
Ownership of capital is assumed to be fully interregionally diversi￿ed; that is, if one region
owns X-percent of the world capital stock, it will own X-percent of the capital in each region.
The income of each region is therefore constant and independent of the location of capital.
World expenditure equals world factor income EW = wLW +
P
￿m￿EW=￿: Without loss of
5generality we choose units so that LW ￿ 1; which gives EW = 1
1￿￿=￿:Income in Core is equal
to its share of world expenditures given by




Y is thus constant irrespective of the location of capital; i.e. also out of long-run equilibrium.
In the production of di⁄erentiated goods, the ￿xed cost consists of capital, whereas the
variable cost consists of labour. Firms are di⁄erentiated, and their ￿rm-speci￿c marginal pro-
duction costs ai are distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(a): Here,
it is also assumed that ￿rms with a lower a has a higher capital cost.6 The capital requirement
for a ￿rm with the labour input coe¢ cient a in sector m is given by hm(a), which is a concave
function in a. Importantly sectoral heterogeneity in our model is simply expressed by di⁄erences
in hm(a), and we write out the sector subscript to stress this. The underlying motivation for
having di⁄erent and sector speci￿c h functions is the above mentioned fact that capital intensity
and capital requirement are substantially heterogeneous across sectors as well as across ￿rms.
Distance is represented by trading costs. Shipping the manufactured good involves a fric-
tional trade cost of the ￿iceberg￿form: for one unit of good from region j to arrive in region l,
￿jl > 1 units must be shipped. Trade costs are also assumed to be equal in both directions so
that ￿jl = ￿lj:






Similar to Baldwin and Okubo (2006), ai is ramdomely allocated among ￿rms. However, dif-
ferent from that model, our model involves two factors (capital and labour), and di⁄erent a0
is
create both heterogeneous capital requirements and per-unit labour requirements. In the short
run, the allocation of KW is taken to be ￿xed. In order to solve the model analytically, we








where ￿ > 1 is a shape parameter and a0 is a scaling parameter. Without loss of generality we
assume that a0 = 1: Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of ￿rms in the two economies before
capital can move.
We also assume the following simple relationship between ai and the ￿xed capital require-
ment:
6This is a standard ￿nding among micro data studies. See e.g. Bernard et al. (2007).











Figure 1: The initial distribution of ￿rm in the two economies
hm(ai) = 2 ￿ a
￿m
i ; (8)
where importantly ￿m ￿ 0 is a sector-speci￿c parameter. For ￿m = 0 we obtain the standard
footloose capital model, while sectors with a positive ￿ have increasing capital requirements
for high productivity ￿rms. We interpret sectors with a high ￿ as sectors with important scale
economies related to ￿xed investments in e.g. R&D.8




































8The capital stock corresponding to Nm = 1 is given by Km =
1 R
0
hmdF(a) = 2 ￿
￿
￿m+￿:
7We note that the number of ￿rms in each sector Nm = 1; which implies that the mass of ￿rms
in the Core is s: The object ￿jl = ￿1￿￿
jl , ranging between 0 and 1, stands for ￿ freeness￿of trade
between countries j and l (0 is autarchy and 1 is zero trade costs). It is assumed that the labour
stock is su¢ ciently large so that the agricultural sector, which pins down the wage, is active in
all regions.
Consider now what would happen if ￿rms were allowed to move between regions. If all ￿rms
have unit capital requirements (￿











is convex and falling in ai. Firms with the highest labour
productivity (lowest ai) will have the strongest incentives to move to the large market. Under
reasonable assumptions of moving costs, this would lead to sorting with the most productive
￿rms in the larger market, as shown by Baldwin and Okubo (2006). In the present paper, on
the contrary, more e¢ cient ￿rms need more capital and the e⁄ect of a; on the return to capital,
depends on the term
a1￿￿
i
hm(ai): Since hm(ai) is concave and a1￿￿
i is convex in ai it will, under
certain conditions, be the case that return to capital is highest for ￿rms with a low ai and ￿rms
with a high ai: Intuitively, ￿rms with the highest sales per unit of capital is either ￿rms with a
very high productivity or ￿rms with a very high labour to capital ratio. These ￿rms are then
also the ￿rms with the strongest incentives to move to the larger region in our model, once we
allow capital to move.
More formally, a ￿rm will move from the periphery to the core when
￿(ai) ￿ ￿￿(ai) ￿ ￿ =
a1￿￿












￿ ￿ > 0; (12)
where ￿ is a per-￿rm ￿xed moving cost. Once ￿rms relocate between countries, moving costs
are required to pay. The shape of this function is determined by the term a1￿￿
(2￿a
￿m
i ); and it is
easily shown by di⁄erentiation that it is U-shaped in a under the condition that ￿ ￿ 1 < ￿m:
Figure 2 illustrates the U-shaped return to capital di⁄erential. Firms between aL and aH
in the ￿gure will tend to locate in the Periphery, since the gains from moving are higher than
the moving cost ￿, while ￿rms at the ends of the productivity distribution to the right of aU
and to the left of aL locate in the large region.
The U-shaped curve is shifted by e.g. changes in trade costs. At the point where the return
to capital di⁄erential curve is tangent to the moving cost ￿; and aL = aU; the model generates
full agglomeration with all manufacturing ￿rms located in the large region, which is the sustain
point. The "a" with aL = aU at the sustain point, denoted by aS; is where the U-curve has its












(￿ ￿ 1 + ￿m)
￿m￿1+￿




















That is, sectors with a high ￿m will require lower moving costs before full agglomeration occurs.
The expression (13) also implicitly de￿nes trade freeness at the sustainpoint. Because the
home-market e⁄ect is hump-shaped in trade costs, so will ￿S be.
The analysis so far has described the locational forces a⁄ecting ￿rms in the short run.
However, to analyse the long run when ￿rms start to move, we need to explicitly model the
dynamics, and we turn to this in the next section.
2.3 Long-run equilibrium
In the long run, capital is fully mobile between regions and responsive to the incentives provided
by the relative returns that can be attained in the two countries.9 We assume a moving cost that
increases with the ￿ ow of migrating ￿rms from the smaller region to the larger one, essentially a
congestion cost, but we also introduce a ￿xed moving cost ￿ that is independent of the migration
￿ ow.10 There is no discounting. The migration pressure will push up migration costs so that
the ￿rst ￿rm to migrate is the ￿rm with the largest gains from this, namely the ￿rm with the
lowest a (see Baldwin and Okubo 2006). The value of migrating for a ￿rm, v; in general depends
on its own marginal cost and the mass of ￿rms that have already migrated from each side of
the distribution, aLR aUR: The value of migrating at a point in time for ￿rms from the upper
and lower part of the distribution is therefore















































9Pro￿t maximisation ensures that capital is located where its return is maximised.
10A much simpler, but less satisfactory approach would be to let all ￿rms make a one shot moving decision






















+ ￿ = ￿￿a
￿￿1




UR (1 ￿ s)
￿
aUR + ￿: (19)
In addition to the ￿xed moving cost ￿, the cost of moving from the periphery to the core will
also depend on a congestion cost. That is, the more ￿rms that move at the same time, the higher
the migration costs. Firms from the high and low end of the distribution of a contribute to the
congestion at the border. However, at the outset, ￿rms from the low end of the distribution
of a will start since the return to capital di⁄erential in (12) goes to in￿nity for a = 0: As the
pressure to migrate declines, ￿rms with a higher a start to move and at the point where the
return to capital di⁄erential for the marginal mover from the low end of the distribution is the
same as for the ￿rm with a = 1; migrations start from both ends. Figure 3 schematically shows
the dynamics.
The resulting long-run equilibrium distribution of ￿rms is illustrated by Figure 4










￿ > 0 for aU and aL in the long-run equilibrium, there is never any tendency for movement
from the large to the small region, meaning that we have one-way sorting.
The long-run aL is determined by the condition that vL(aUR;aLR) = 0; while aU is given
by vU(aUR;aLR) = 0 if aU 2 (0;1); otherwise aU = 1: The latter condition incorporates the
fact that it is the ￿rms from the low end that start moving, and ￿rms from the other end of
the distribution only start moving when trade freeness has reached ￿ = b ￿: Using aU = 1 in (12)
gives b ￿ = 1 ￿
￿(￿￿￿)
￿￿mB which is exogenous from the point of view of the ￿rm.
Speci￿cally, the long-run equilibrium cuto⁄s, aU;aL, are solved by















￿ ￿ = 0 (20)
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Figure 4: The long-run distribution of ￿rms
where ￿ ￿
￿
1￿￿+￿ > 1. Here, we assume that 1￿￿+￿ > 0 to ensure convergence of the integrals.
Since ￿ > 1; this condition implies that ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1 > 1.
The cuto⁄ relations: Unless the equilibrium is a corner solution, i.e. aU 2 (0;1) and











L) is always satis￿ed. Note that if ￿ = 0, we have aU = aL, which
means that we have one-sided sorting as in Baldwin and Okubo (2006).
When trade costs are su¢ ciently high, only low a ￿rms relocate, implying a single cut-o⁄
aL. At a level of trade costs, ￿B, both low and high a ￿rms start to migrate, leading to two-way
sorting. The aL-cuto⁄when the lowest productivity ￿rm (aU = 1) starts to move from the small




and the sustainpoint ￿S , which is the trade costs with aS = aU = aL, is de￿ned by
(aS)1￿￿








Closed form solutions for the long-run critical values of a are hard to obtain. Therefore we
simulate the model. Figure 5 simulates the e⁄ect of reducing ￿ on aU and aL for some typical
parameter values (￿ = 0:3;￿ = 2;￿ = 3;￿ = 2;￿ = 0:7;s = 0:6): Note how only high-productive
￿rms (￿rms with a low a) move at the beginning. As ￿ reaches a su¢ ciently low level also ￿rms
with low productivity from the other end of the distribution start to move, thus leading to
two-sided sorting.









Figure 5: The e⁄ect of lower moving cost
6 for the same parameter valuse. Stronger agglomeration forces imply that the relative return
to capital increases in the large region (Core). This means that the U-shaped curve in Figure
2 shifts upwards, leading to convergence of aU and aL: However, agglomeration forces are U-
shaped in ￿ in this type of model, and Figure 6 therefore shows how aU and aL ￿rst converge
and thereafter diverge as trade costs are reduced. Agglomeration forces are maximal at the
point where the distance between aU and aL is smallest.
Finally, maintaining the same parameter values, Figure 7 illustrates the e⁄ect of ￿: Sectors
with a higher ￿ tend to have more two-sided sorting. However, the sorting from the low end is
U-shaped in ￿:
2.4 Average Productivity
A key feature of the Melitz model is that productivity increases due to trade liberalisation as
the least productive ￿rms disappear. Here no ￿rms die, since there are no entry costs, but ￿rms
move and this a⁄ects sector productivity and therefore, average productivity. Productivity
in a sector in the two economies can be de￿ned as a frequency weighted mean of individual











Figure 6: The e⁄ect of lower trade costs
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First, a reduction in the ￿xed moving cost leads to a fall in average productivity in the Periphery
and an increase in the Core. It is also the case that sectors with high capital requirements tend
to have a higher productivity in the large region and a lower productivity in the small region.
That
Moreover, in spite of two-way sorting, it is always the case that productivity is higher in the
core as illustrated by using (19):




L )) > 0 (26)
Finally, the results for trade liberalisation are ambigous.
2.5 Two-sided Sorting
A distinctive feature of our model is the occurrence of two-sided sorting. The simulations above
indicate that two-sided sorting increases as the ￿xed moving cost ￿ is reduced. This result is






@￿ < 0; where 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ > 0:
Second, the result that
d(aU￿aL)
d￿ < 0 implies that the degree of two-sided sorting increases




While agglomeration, selection, one-sided sorting, and two-sided sorting all lead to higher av-
erage productivity in the core region, they have di⁄erent implications for the distribution of
￿rm productivities in the core versus the periphery. Figure 8 schematically shows the four
11The result is derived under the condition that aU < 1: That is, the result does not necessarily hold when
there is only one-sided sorting, as illustrated in Figure 7.
16cases. The solid line in the ￿gure indicates distribution in Core and the dotted line indicates
the distribution in Periphery. Figure 8a shows a sector with a pattern consistent with standard
agglomeration models, implying that all ￿rms bene￿t from being in the core, thus implying that
the productivity distribution of the core ￿rms is shifted to the right as compared to the distrib-
ution of the ￿rms in the periphery.12 Next, Figure 8b shows the selection case as in a standard
heterogeneous-￿rm model where the distribution in the core is left truncated. Finally, Figures
8c and 8d illustrate sorting. In Figure 8c, which illustrates one-sided sorting, the distribution
of the periphery is truncated from the right because the most productive ￿rms migrate to the
centre, thus producing an upward jump in the distribution in the core. Figure 8d shows the case
modelled in this paper where the periphery is truncated from both sides as a result of two-sided
sorting.
12This is the cleanest case. Naturally, it is possible to assume e.g. that more productive ￿rms have better






Figure 8c: One-sided sorting
productivity
Figure 8d: Two-sided sorting
These patterns imply a number of testable hypotheses concerning di⁄erences between the
core and the periphery of all ￿rst three moments of the productivity distribution of ￿rms. Table
1 shows the predictions for the moments in the four cases shown in Figure 8, where superscript
"c" indicates the core. Pure agglomeration only a⁄ects the mean (
_
x). Selection and sorting
a⁄ect all three moments but the important di⁄erence is a di⁄erent sign of the spread-gap, sc￿s;
between the core and the periphery. Selection reduces the spread of the distribution of the core,
whereas sorting instead leads to a larger spread in the core. Finally, the di⁄erence between
one- and two-sided sorting is just that the di⁄erence in skewness (g) between the core and the

























x sc > s gc ￿ g
(Table 1)
Clearly, several of these mechanisms may be active simultaneously in practice. The question is
therefore rather which of them dominate. The answer, as we will see next, di⁄ers depending on
which sector we study.
3.2 Data
Here we use ￿rm (plant) level data from Japan￿ s Census of Manufacturers (METI) virtually
covering all plants with more than ￿ve employees in 1990, classi￿ed at the three-digit sector
level.13. In total, 324,000 plants and 154 sectors. The sector classi￿cation is shown in the
appendix. The manufacturing census contains basic information on plants, such as output
(shipment) and employment (number of regular workers), but no identi￿er linking ￿rms under
the same ownership. Hence, aggregation of the data is not possible.
There are 47 prefectures14. We de￿ne the core region as the 16 central prefectures sur-
rounding Tokyo, Osaka(the second largest), Nagoya (the third) as well as Fukuoka (the fourth)
prefecture. Together, they constitute the Japanese manufacturing belt. The peripheral regions
are de￿ned as the other 30 prefectures in the mainland (excluding Okinawa).
Productivity is measured by value added (unit: million yen) per regular number of employ-
ees. The capital labour ratio is measured by capital asset (unit: million yen) per employed
individuals. All variables are in logs. Descriptive statistics are shown in the appendix. The
regional GDP measure is taken from Fukao and Yue (2000).
3.3 Analysis
First, Table 2 shows that our data at the sectoral level has standard properties. The produc-
tivity gap between the core and the periphery, measured as the di⁄erence in value added per
employee (in logs) for plants in the central districts of Japan compared to plants in peripheral
districts at the three-digit sectoral level, increases with the distance between the core and the
periphery and decreases with the size of the periphery. As a proxy for trade cost, we use the
minimum geographical distance from the bipolar largest cities (Tokyo or Osaka) for 46 prefec-
131990 is the last period of interregional relocation within Japan. From the mid 1990s and onwards, Japanese
￿rms became very active in FDI and outsourcing, which may blur the pattern of interregional relocation within
Japan.
14The Japanese prefectures are administrative units similar to the NUTS2 regions in EU. The Okinawa island
is excluded. Thus our data sample is 46 prefectures.












t-statistic in parenthesis. *=10%,**=5%,
and ***=1% significance level.
tures (excluding Okinawa) (unit: km). As shown by Okubo and Tomimira (2010a), similar
properties hold for this dataset when the data is aggregated.
Our variables of interest are sectoral di⁄erences (gaps) in mean productivity, standard de-





x; sc ￿ s; and gc ￿ g: The
theoretical models discussed above predict a higher productivity in the core and we therefore





x > 0: Among these, sectors with a negative spread gap sc ￿s < 0
are considered to be dominated by selection, and sectors with sc ￿ s > 0 to be dominated by
sorting (compare Table 1). Finally, we make a di⁄erence between one- and two-sided sorting by
looking at the skewness gap, gc ￿ g: We will label sectors as subject to two-way sorting when
the skewness gap is not too large. For illustrative purposes, we label a sector as subject to
two-sided sorting when jgc ￿ gj < 0:5: Naturally, the exact limit between one- and two-sided
sorting is arbitrary.
Figures 9a-d show a few examples of our estimated kernel density function in core and pe-
riphery, respectively. The ￿gures single out representative sectors that are classi￿ed as agglom-
eration (Figure 9a), selection (Figure 9b), one-sided sorting (Figure 9c) and two-sided sorting
(Figure 9d). As illustrated by the ￿gures, real world cases are less clear than the stylised the-
oretical cases, and several of the above mentioned mechanisms behind the higher productivity
in the core could certainly be present at the same time. The question is therefore rather which
mechanism tends to dominate for each sector.
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Figure 9d: 308 Parts and components to
electronic devices
A comprehensive picture is given by Figure 10 which plots the spread gap, sc ￿ s; against






x > 0; (numerical values for all sectors are shown in Table A2 in the
appendix). Each dot indicates the spread and skewness gaps in each of the 30 peripheral
prefectures against the average of the 16 core prefectures. Using the classi￿cation in Table 1,
sectors in the South Western quadrant would be classi￿ed as dominated by selection, whereas
the North Western quadrant are sectors dominated by sorting. Two-sided sorting would produce
a smaller skewness-gap and they are therefore located closer to the vertical zero skewness-gap
line, whereas sectors dominated by one-sided sorting would lie further to the left in the North-
Western quadrant. The general picture is that both sorting and selection seem to be present in
a large number of cases.15
15It is possible that agglomeration externalities would be biased e.g. so that more productive ￿rms have a better
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Figure 11: Aggregated sorting and selection
To get a clearer picture, Figure 11 plots the spread gap against the skewness gap with all






x < 0). The aggregated ￿gure makes it easier to illustrate the four di⁄erent cases of
interest: Green indicates selection and yellow agglomeration. Red and blue are two-sided and
one-sided sorting. A relatively large number of sectors located in the South-Western quadrant
have a pattern consistent with selection (green), and a similar number of sectors consistent with
sorting (blue and red). Fewer sector could be classi￿ed as pure agglomeration (yellow). The
￿gure is illustrative and the classi￿cation of agglomeration and two-sided and one-sided sorting
based on the size of the skewness gap is naturally arbitrary. Choosing a more narrow de￿nition
of two-sided sorting would e.g. shrink the cluster of red points from both sides and expand the
number of blue points. Likewise would a tighter limit of skewness gap for agglomeration shrink
the yellow point cluster.
3.4 Capital intensity and sorting
Our model associates two-sided sorting with high capital intensity of a sector as illustrated in
Figure 7. Two-sided sorting reduces the skewness in peripheral regions, and we would therefore
expect to see a negative relationship between capital intensity and the skewness gap. Table 3
shows that the skewnessgap is robustly negatively related to the capital labour ratio of a sector.
Also the e⁄ect of distance is estimated with the expected sign since longer distance implies
higher trade costs and therefore less sorting. The realtionship is also robust to the inclusion of
several contrpls such as the size of the sector (measured by employment):
We now turn to investigating skewness in the periphery, which may be an even more direct
measure of two-sided sorting. Table 4 shows how the skewness in peripheral regions at the
sectorial level is negatively associated with the capital labour ratio. This relationship is once
higher spread in the core corresponding to the Northeastern quadrant in the ￿gure.
















R2-adj. 0.012 0.016 0.016
F-stat 33.32 22.16 15.7
N.obs. 2644 2644 2644
t-statistic in parenthesis. *=10%,**=5%, and
***=1% significance level.
more robust to the inclusion of several control variables such as distance and ￿rms￿employment
level (￿rm size).
The distinct feature of two-sided sorting in our model, compared to e.g. one-sided sorting or
selection, is that ￿rms with a low productivity move from the periphery to the core. The degree
to which this will happen depends on the capital intensity of a sector. To measure this e⁄ect as
directly as possible, we calculate the productivity level by sector in the periphery for which the
cumulative density is 25 percent, and relate this measure to the capital intensity of the sector.
The productivity distribution starts at zero in each sector.16 Sorting from the low end means
that the productitvty distribution is hollowed out at the low end, which means that the 25
percentile productivity level becomes higher. Thus, the model predicts a positive relationship
between the lower 25 percentile productivity level and the capital intensity of a sector in the
periphery.
Figure 12 plots this relationship for all sectors. There seems to be a robust positive relation-
ship for a large group of sectors but also a very di⁄erent pattern for a large group of outliers.
Regressing the sectorial capital labour ratio on the lower 25 percentile productivity level does
not produce a signi￿cant positive relationship. The outliers are primarily sectors with few large
and badly performing ￿rms implying that most of the mass of the productivty distribution is
concentred close to zero.17 Requiring the standard deviation to be larger than 0.7 weeds out
some of the sectors with the most concentrated productivity distribution. Table 5 shows the
regression results for this sample. The positive relationship is robust to controlling for the size
16Some ￿rms display a negative value added per employee. We have set these to zero in order to be able to
take logs.
17Firms with a negative value added are set to zero in order to be able to take logs.
















R2-adj. 0.0016 0.004 0.014
F-stat 5.15 6.3 13.07
N.obs. 2644 2644 2644
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Figure 12: Productivity against the the capital labour ratio for the 25 percent lower tail of the
productivity distribution for di⁄erent sectors.
25Table 5 The productivity level at
















t-statistic in parenthesis. *=10%,**=5%,
and ***=1% significance level.
of the sector in terms of employment. Distance does not apply since we are just regressing
sectors in the periphery.
264 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of two-sided spatial sorting, where high-productivity ￿rms with
a high capital intensity and low-productivity ￿rms with a low capital intensity tend to locate
in the large core region. Firms with intermediate productivity and capital intensity remain in
the periphery. We show that a reduction in the ￿xed moving cost leads to a fall in average
productivity in the small foreign country and an increase in the large home economy. It is also
the case that sectors with high capital requirements will have a higher productivity in the large
region than in the small region.
To empirically distinguish between standard agglomeration externalities, sorting and se-
lection we note that sorting has a very di⁄erent implication for the second- and third-order
moments of the productivity distribution of ￿rms in the di⁄erent regions. While externalities
have no e⁄ect on the distribution spread and selection reduces the spread in the core, sorting
will increase the spread in the core, as ￿rms from possibly both ends of the productivity distri-
bution move from the periphery to the core. In the case of two-sided sorting, the e⁄ect on the
skewness of the distribution in the core and the periphery may be weaker than in the case of
one-sided sorting, in which case only ￿rms from the upper tail move.
We use data from Japan￿ s Census of Manufacturers covering virtually all plants with more
than ￿ve employees in 1990, classi￿ed at the three-digit sector level, to investigate the predictions
of the model. A problem here is that agglomeration, selection and sorting can all be present
at the same time, and the question is therefore rather which of these forces dominate for a
speci￿c sector. When plotting the di⁄erence in the distribution spread between the core and
the periphery against the di⁄erence of skewness between these, selection and sorting seem to be
dominating for a roughly equal share of the sectors.
A main result from our model is that the tendency for two-sided sorting is positively related
to the capital labour ratio of a sector. We test this prediction by comparing the skewness of
the core and the peripheral regions, but also by directly analysing the peripheral distributions.
Empirical evidence supports the predicition that sectors with a high capital labour ratio have











































where ￿ ￿ a1￿￿
(￿￿￿)(2￿a￿): Since d￿































d￿ < 0; d￿
daU < 0; dB
d￿￿ > 0; d￿￿












(1 ￿ ￿)a￿￿(2 ￿ a￿) + ￿a￿￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ a￿)2 ;
The denominator is decreasing in a: Di⁄erentiating the numerator w.r.t. a gives
a￿￿￿1 ((2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)a￿) > a￿￿￿1(2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿))
= a￿￿￿1(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 1 + ￿)
the righ hand side expression is positive for ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿ > 0; which is assured by our previous
assumptions that 1￿￿ +￿ > 0; and the condition that ￿ > 1: Therefore d2￿
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295.2 Sector Classi￿cation: Table A1
sector sector
121 Livestock products 243 Cut stock and findings for boots and shoes
122 Seafood products 244 Leather footwear
123 Canned and preserved fruit and vegetable
products 245 Leather gloves and mittens
124 Seasonings 246 Luggage
125 Sugar processing 247 Handbags and small leather cases
126 Flour and grain mill products 248 Fur skins
127 Bakery and confectionery products 249 Miscellaneous leather products
128 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 251 Glass and its products
129 Miscellaneous foods and related products 252 Cement and its products
131 Soft drinks and carbonated water 253 Structural clay products, except those of
pottery
132 Alcoholic beverages 254 Pottery and related products
133 Tea and coffee 255 Clay refractories
134 Manufactured ice 256 Carbon and graphite products
135 Prepared animal foods and organic
fertilizers 257 Abrasive products
141 Silk reeling plants 258 Aggregate and stone products
142 Spinning mills 259 Miscellaneous ceramic, stone and clay
products
143 Twisting and bulky yarns 262 Iron smelting, without blast furnaces
144 Woven fabric mills 263 Steel, with rolling facilities
145 Manufacturing kni 264 Steel materials, except made by smelting
furnaces and with rolling facilities
146 Dyed and finished textiles 265 Coated steel
147 Rope and netting 266 Forging steel manufacturing forged products
148 Lace and other textile goods 267 Pig iron article of cast metal manufacturing
149 Miscellaneous textile mill products 269 Miscellaneous iron and steel
151 Textile outer garments, except japanese
style 271 Primary smelting and refining of non-ferrous
metals
152 Shirts and Underwear, except japanese style 272 Secondary smelting and refining of
nonferrous metals
153 Hat manufacturing 273 Rolling of non-ferrous metals and alloys,
including drawing and extruding
154 Fur apparel and apparel accessories 274 Non-ferrous metal machine parts and tooling
products
155 Other textile apparel and accessories,
including japanese style 275 Electric wire and cable
159 Miscellaneous fabricated textile products 279 Miscellaneous non-ferrous metal products
161 Sawing, planning mills and wood products 281 Tin cans and other plated sheet products
162 Millwork, plywood and prefabricated
structural wood products 282 Tableware (occidental type), cutlery, hand
tools and hardware
163 Wooden, bamboo and rattan containers 283 Heating apparatus and plumbing supplies
164 Wooden footwear manufacturing 284 Fabricated constructional and architectural
metal products
169 Miscellaneous manufacture of wood
products 285 Metal machine parts and tooling products
171 Furniture 286 Metal coating, engraving and heat reating,
except enameled ironware
172 Furniture for religious purposes 287 Fabricated wire products
173 Sliding doors and screens 288 Bolts, nuts, rivets, machine screws and wood
screws
179 Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures 289 Miscellaneous fabricated metal products
181 Pulp 291 Boilers, engines and turbines
182 Paper 292 Agricultural machinery and equipment
183 Coated and glazed paper 293 Machinery and equipment for construction
30183 Coated and glazed paper 293 Machinery and equipment for construction
and mining, including tractors
184 Paper products 294 Metal working machinery
185 Paper containers 295 Textile machinery
189 Miscellaneous pulp, paper and paper
worked products 296 Special industry machinery
191 Newspaper industries 297 General industry machinery and equipment
192 Publishing industries 298 Office, service industry and household
machines
193 Printing, except mimeograph printing
industries 299 Miscellaneous machinery and machine parts
194 Plate making for printing 301 Electrical generating, transmission,
distribution and industrial apparatus
195 Bookbinding and printed matter 302 Household electric appliances
199 Service industries related to printing trade 303 Electric bulbs and lighting fixtures
201 Chemical fertilizers 304 Communication equipment and related
products
202 Industrial inorganic chemicals 305 Electronic data processing machines,
computers, equipment and accessories
203 Industrial organic chemicals 306 Electronic equipment
204 Chemical fibres 307 Electric measuring instruments
205 Oil and fat products, soaps, synthetic
detergents 308 Electronic parts and devices
206 Drugs and medicines 309 Miscellaneous electrical machinery
equipment and supplies
209 Miscellaneous chemical and allied products 311 Motor vehicles, parts and accessories
211 Petroleum refining 312 Railroad equipment and parts
212 Lubricating oils and greases (not made in
petroleum refineries) 313 Bicycles and parts
213 Coke 314 Shipbuilding and repairing, and marine
engines
214 Briquettes and briquette balls 315 Aircraft and parts
215 Paving materials 319 Miscellaneous transportation equipment
219 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 321 Measuring instruments, analytical
instruments and testing machines
221 Plastic plates, bars and rods, pipes and tubes 322 Surveying instruments
222 Plastic films, sheets, floor coverings and
synthetic leather 323 Medical instruments and apparatus
223 Industrial plastic products 324 Physical and chemical instruments
224 Foamed and reinforced plastic products 325 Optical instruments and lenses
225 Compounding plastic materials, including
reclaimed plastics 326 Ophthalmic goods, including frames
229 Miscellaneous plastic products 327 Watches, clocks, clockwork-operated devices
and parts
231 Tires and inner tubes 331 Manufacture of ordnance and accessories
232 Rubber and plastic footwear and its findings 343 Toys and sporting goods
233 Rubber belts and hoses and mechanical
rubber goods products 344 Pens, lead pencils, painting materials and
stationery
239 Miscellaneous rubber products 345 Costume jewellery, costume accessories,
buttons and related products
241 Leather tanning and finishing 346 Lacquer ware
242 Mechanical leather products, except gloves
and mittens 348 Manufacturing industries, n.e.c
349 Manufacturing industries, n.e.c
315.3 Gap estimates per sector: Table A2
Type: , "1": 1-sided sorting case,"2": 2-sided sorting case, "3":selection case, "4":Agglomera-
tion case
sector x-gap s-gap g-gap Type sector x-gap s-gap g-gap Type
121 0,28 0,02 -0,53 1 179 0,16 0,04 0,01 A
122 0,24 -0,11 0,02 A 181 -0,28 -0,52 1,12
123 0,24 -0,05 -0,14 S 182 0,73 -0,10 -0,48 S
124 0,22 0,02 0,17 2 183 0,19 -0,01 -2,69 S
125 0,83 -0,40 1,25 184 0,07 -0,06 -0,89 S
126 0,00 0,31 -0,79 185 0,22 -0,18 0,60
127 0,18 -0,02 0,25 189 0,22 -0,19 -0,12 S
128 0,14 0,48 -1,89 1 191 0,23 0,13 -1,87 1
129 0,26 -0,05 -0,14 S 192 0,60 0,13 0,04 2
131 0,58 -0,61 1,54 193 0,31 0,10 -0,26 2
132 0,01 0,03 -0,13 2 194 0,31 0,00 0,04 A
133 0,38 -0,03 -0,90 S 195 0,27 -0,03 1,29
134 0,03 0,03 2,02 199 0,54 0,34 -1,63 1
135 0,10 -0,27 -0,51 S 201 -0,43 0,48 0,91
141 -0,23 0,45 0,29 202 -0,08 0,26 -2,09
142 0,13 0,14 1,71 203 0,19 -0,99 0,28
143 -0,11 -0,01 -0,19 204 -0,47 1,31 -2,11
144 -0,07 -0,02 -0,21 205 0,23 0,11 -1,64 1
145 0,25 -0,06 1,39 206 0,23 -0,35 0,67
146 0,02 -0,03 -0,41 S 209 0,07 -0,24 1,74
147 0,17 -0,01 -1,27 S 211 1,97 -1,13 -1,61 S
148 -0,05 0,02 0,41 212 0,28 -0,06 -0,55 S
149 0,04 -0,01 0,64 215 0,27 0,12 -0,74 1
151 0,18 0,00 0,53 219 0,70 -0,90 2,16
152 0,25 0,07 1,33 221 0,22 -0,23 2,20
153 0,44 -0,05 0,52 222 0,09 -0,16 0,56
154 0,10 0,37 -2,70 1 223 0,06 0,06 0,24 2
155 0,14 0,16 -1,33 1 224 0,09 0,07 -1,03 1
159 0,04 0,01 0,36 2 225 0,23 0,10 -0,67 1
161 0,11 0,12 -0,03 2 229 0,07 -0,04 0,86
162 0,14 -0,08 0,96 231 -0,33 0,92 -2,49
163 0,29 -0,18 0,07 232 0,14 -0,05 0,64
164 -0,06 -0,79 2,40 233 0,13 -0,14 -0,43 S
169 0,30 -0,01 0,23 239 0,28 -0,24 1,05
171 0,12 0,00 0,83 241 0,30 0,18 -1,23 1
172 0,10 0,09 -1,02 1 242 0,36 -0,30 -1,34 S
173 0,15 0,12 -0,65 1 243 0,47 0,15 1,20
244 0,34 -0,11 -0,86 S
32Type: , "1": 1-sided sorting case,"2": 2-sided sorting case, "3":selection case, "4":Agglom-
eration case
sector x-gap s-gap g-gap Type sector x-gap s-gap g-gap Type
245 0,40 -0,76 1,53 294 0,09 0,01 0,32 2
246 0,23 -0,31 1,84 295 0,04 0,06 -1,64 1
247 0,21 0,08 0,16 2 296 0,13 -0,01 0,41
248 3,25 -2,48 0,20 297 0,15 -0,20 2,09
249 0,52 0,14 -0,48 2 298 0,21 0,00 0,23 2
251 0,09 -0,07 -0,73 S 299 0,16 0,02 -0,14 2
252 0,15 0,06 -0,56 1 301 0,26 -0,03 -0,06 A
253 0,11 0,12 0,39 2 302 0,29 -0,07 1,59
254 0,13 0,05 -0,16 2 303 0,27 0,05 -0,62 1
255 -0,45 0,19 -0,69 304 0,35 0,15 0,07 2
256 0,15 0,17 -0,23 2 305 0,29 0,03 0,06 A
257 0,02 0,21 -2,91 1 306 0,33 0,15 -1,50 1
258 0,12 -0,13 0,88 307 0,30 -0,33 2,57
259 0,02 -0,16 0,34 308 0,29 0,06 -0,26 2
263 -0,10 0,13 0,05 2 309 0,18 -0,05 1,04
264 0,19 0,56 -4,59 1 311 0,13 -0,03 0,32
265 0,93 -0,28 -1,58 S 312 0,01 -0,01 0,92
266 0,20 0,07 -0,28 2 313 0,36 -0,03 0,11
267 0,22 0,07 -2,16 1 314 0,19 0,00 -0,90 1
269 0,23 -0,14 0,49 315 0,10 0,05 -0,18 2
271 0,15 0,09 -0,63 1 319 0,16 0,11 -0,19 2
272 0,36 -0,36 -0,02 S 321 0,15 0,00 -0,75 1
273 -0,25 0,27 -2,30 322 -0,02 0,29 -1,23
274 0,04 0,08 -1,41 1 323 0,22 -0,05 1,28
275 0,38 -0,25 1,95 324 0,26 -0,74 3,36
279 0,18 0,11 -1,53 1 325 0,29 0,00 -0,23 S
281 0,11 0,10 -1,91 1 326 0,06 -0,06 1,64
282 0,19 0,08 -0,38 2 327 0,23 0,04 0,46 2
283 0,20 0,02 -0,01 A 331 0,47 -1,11 1,83
284 0,14 0,00 -0,17 2 341 0,09 -0,24 -0,44 S
285 0,08 0,01 -0,10 2 342 -0,02 -0,34 2,63
286 0,19 -0,14 0,95 343 0,10 -0,13 0,40
287 0,13 -0,10 1,31 344 0,14 0,01 -0,60 1
288 0,04 0,06 -0,66 1 345 0,21 0,08 -1,99 1
289 0,23 -0,06 -0,17 S 346 0,06 0,14 -1,58 1
291 0,11 -0,22 1,94 348 0,26 0,02 0,07 A
292 -0,01 0,17 -1,75 349 0,40 -0,11 0,09
293 0,10 0,04 0,31 2
335.4 Descriptive statistics: Table A3
1. 30 Peripherial Prefectures with Average of Core Prefectures
Variables ObservationsMean Std. Dev. Min Max
meangap 2644 0,217344 0,352457 -1,343929 2,374911
stdgap 2644 0,094221 0,395814 -2,592987 1,59148
skewgap 2644 -1,327319 1,353942 -5,14438 4,154283
std periphery 2644 0,746842 0,407578 0,053094 4,169486
skew periphery 2644 -0,600088 1,164951 -5,340727 2,57987
Dist 2644 5,451519 0,784737 3,427515 6,725274
Emp 2644 2,442071 0,502103 1,386294 4,942278
lkl 2644 3,604542 0,78518 -0,993252 8,060988
2. Sector Regressions
Variables ObservationsMean Std. Dev. Min Max
std 150 0,858653 0,27957 0,249146 2,730309
mean 150 6,162526 0,357962 5,057228 7,780544
std periphery 150 0,903392 0,396367 0,181375 3,859641
lvaemp 150 6,085545 0,391167 4,631279 7,819726
KL 150 6,085545 0,391167 4,631279 7,819726
Lower25 150 4,393508 1,92145 0 6,414497
emp 150 2,369816 0,476651 1,722575 5,365081
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